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A TWO-STAGE MODEL FOR SOCIAL NETWORK 
INVESTIGATIONS IN DIGITAL FORENSICS  










The proliferation of social networking sites has 
improved ways in which users engage and form 
relationships with people of similar interests, going 
beyond the days of email communications to the 
use of social networking applications to share 
messages, photos, and videos. It has also provided 
an opportunity for some users to perpetrate 
unlawful activities. 
Social networking presents challenges to digital 
forensic investigations; for example, content posted 
may not always be written to permanent storage 
media. In addition, communication content can be 
altered or deleted after the fact. There is a need for 
digital forensic investigators to be able to recover 
such messages or other evidence that may be used 
to infer user activity and sufficiently attribute an 
action/actions to a user. 
Evidence from social networking activity may be 
required in different types of criminal or corporate 
investigations. The type of evidence recovered 
helps the investigator obtain useful information that 
could: 
• Guide the initial stages of an investigation, 
e.g., determining if a based on the evidence 
recovered; the suspect is worth 
investigating further 
• Generate new leads which may lead to the: 
o Identification of other persons, 
places or items of interest 
o Identification of other potential 
sources of digital evidence to 
facilitate decision making 
1.1 Contribution 
The key contribution of this paper is the proposal of 
a two-stage model for evidence recovery and 
investigations involving social networking 
activities. It aims to help investigators prioritize 
digital evidence and maximize efficiency where 
resources are limited by focusing on extracting 
meaningful information from social networking 
artifacts. It is focused on the prompt identification 
and interpretation of associated artifacts and is 
aimed at enabling the analyst to quickly determine 
whether to expand or narrow the scope of an 
investigation. 
1.2 Paper Structure 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: 
related work is discussed in Section 2. Section 3 
proposes a two-stage model for social networking 
investigation in digital forensics. Section 4 
discusses the experimental and analysis 
methodologies for this work. The research results 
and the implementation of the proposed model is 
presented in Section 5. Finally, the conclusions and 
potential future work stemming from this research 
are presented in Section 6. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section provides a background on related work 
in digital forensics and social networking 
investigations. It discusses the requirements for the 
admissibility of digital evidence and the evidential 
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value of data generated as a result of user social 
networking activity.  
2.1 Digital Evidence 
Digital evidence can be described as any data that 
can be used to determine intent, culpability, how an 
event occurred, and the parties involved. It is useful 
in the investigation of a range of computer crimes 
and non-computer related crimes where evidence 
from a digital device may be used to link a suspect 
to an offense (Casey, Foundations of Digital 
Forensics, in Digital Evidence and Computer 
Crime. Forensic Science, Computers and the 
Internet, 2011). 
Casey (2011) defines digital evidence as “data 
stored or transmitted using a computer that supports 
or refutes a theory on how an event occurred.” 
Digital evidence is crucial in digital investigation 
and thus must be acquired in a forensically sound 
manner (McKemmish, 2008) to ensure that its 
admissibility in a court of law. 
ACPO's (2012) definition of digital evidence 
encompasses a range of artifacts that can be found 
on digital devices, for example, system log files, 
application logs etc. Multiple devices with various 
artifacts, whilst ideal sources of digital evidence, 
present the challenge of “weeding out” information 
not directly relevant to the case. When time is of 
the essence, an investigator needs to be able to 
adequately identify devices that contain evidence 
pertinent to the case and use the intelligence 
obtained from those devices to progress the 
investigation. 
Although the processing of digital evidence varies 
across jurisdictions, there are a few requirements 
digital evidence needs to meet before it is deemed 
admissible in court (Casey, 2005, Casey, 2002, 
Murr, 2007, Sommer, 1999): 
• Evidence submitted must be relevant to the 
case. 
• The evidence must be reliable 
• The methods used to produce the evidence 
must be repeatable and should produce the 
same results when applied independently 
by a third party. 
• The evidence must be authentic (genuine) 
and can be verified using hash values 
generated prior to and after imaging a 
device. 
• The evidence must be valid and error-free. 
In exceptional circumstances where 
evidence acquisition from an active device 
is required, the process must be accurately 
documented, and any alteration accounted 
for. 
• The evidence must be trustworthy and 
believable beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In order to be admissible in court, evidence from 
social networking activity must satisfy these 
requirements. 
2.2 Social Networking 
Social networking has been defined as “the activity 
of sharing information and communicating with 
groups of people using the internet, especially 
through websites that are specially designed for this 
purpose” (Cambridge University Press, 2019). It 
enables users to connect with others and to form 
personal or business relationships. 
In the context of digital evidence acquisition, social 
network activity provides a plethora of digital 
evidence to investigators. Artifacts from web 
browser history, cache, cookies etc. can be used to 
determine and infer a relationship between a user 
and a social network account or another user and 
may also be used to attribute an action to a user. 
This includes, but is not limited to, determining 
dates and times of access, usernames, session 
information etc.  
In spite of the advantages presented by social 
networking applications (instant messaging, sharing 
personal events, microblogging, personal or 
corporate marketing, advertising etc.), it has also 
been known to present a means for a small minority 
of users to engage in disagreeable or criminal 
activities (Bello, 2013; Jonsson, 2011; Osborne, 
2010; Richards, 2007; Rankin, 2012; House of 
Lords Select Committee on Communications, 2014; 
BBC News, Huge rise in social media “crimes”, 
2012; Moore, 2014; McGuire, 2019). 
Investigating a user’s (or suspect’s) social network 
activity may be required for several reasons such as 
the collection of evidence to be used in court for the 
prosecution of an offender or for use in disciplinary 
actions taken against employees who abuse 
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corporate Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) (Taylor, 
Haggerty, Gresty, Almond, & Berry, T, 2014).  
The Crown Prosecution Service (2018) provides 
guidance on how Prosecutors are to proceed to trial 
once they are satisfied with the evidence obtained 
during investigations involving social networking 
activity. However, there are no defined guidelines 
for digital forensic investigators with regard to 
prioritizing evidence collection and the 
management of artifacts related to social 
networking.  
Taylor et al., (2014) suggests that although there 
are no specific guidelines for the forensic 
investigation of social networking applications, 
ACPO Guidelines can be used as a starting point 
for the investigation of offenses committed through 
or with a social networking application. It can thus 
be inferred that the lack of defined guidelines often 
results in such investigations being broadly 
categorized under ‘web browser forensics’ (Cusack 
& Son, 2012) due to the nature of access on a 
computer (while comparable, access through 
mobile devices is not considered here as it is 
considered outside the scope of this paper). 
However, it is suggested that focus on features 
specific to social networks, e.g., user IDs, profile 
IDs, etc. can also be used as a viable technique for 
evidence acquisition using methods tailored to web 
browser forensics.  
Keyvanpour et al., (2014) present a three-phase 
framework for social network forensics; however, 
the specifics and potential location of artifacts of 
interest and techniques for recovery were not 
discussed. Oh et al., (2011) proposed an integrated 
method for the collection and analysis of web 
browser evidence where multiple web browsers 
have been used in the commission of an offense. 
This is based on the need to recover and utilize data 
created and stored on disk when a user accesses 
social networking sites using a web browser. It is 
important to note that due to the nature and 
flexibility of social networking applications, 
materials posted or shared can be later modified or 
deleted. In such situations, the service provider may 
be in a position to provide the evidence required to 
determine the author, when content was modified 
(or deleted) and reconstruct events.  
Although at the time of writing there is a research 
gap in the use of social network artifacts as digital 
evidence (Taylor et al., 2014; Arshad et al., 2019; 
Das et al., 2016; Zainudin et al., 2011; Jang & 
Kwak, 2015; Huber, et al., 2011; Powell & Haynes, 
2019), there are a number of reported cases where 
evidence from social networking activity has 
successfully led to prosecution (BBC News, 2010; 
Haroon & Carter, 2019; Bowcott et al., 2011; Press 
Association, 2014; Agency, 2015; Wood, 2018). In 
discussing evidence collection from social network 
activity, Arshad et al., (2019) grouped social 
network artifacts into four distinct classes, User, 
Activity, Network, and Content: 
• User: consists of user data such as profile 
information, name, email address, phone 
numbers etc. 
• Activity: consists of a timeline of user 
actions logged by the service provider on 
the server-side, e.g., dates and time of 
activity, location information, source of 
post, e.g., phone, tablet etc. These types of 
artifacts are created as a result of user 
actions on the social networking site; for 
example, when a user posts a comment 
about the service at a restaurant, the service 
provider tags the comment with the date 
and time, it's posted (see Figure 1). The 
location may also be included if 
geolocation is enabled. The user is unable 
to directly modify these types of artifacts. 
 
Figure 1 Activity time, date, source of tweet, number of retweets and likes illustrating server-side elements 
Source: https://www.twitter.com
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• Network: consists of personal social 
connections such as individuals or groups 
following or being followed by a user. 
• Content: consists of materials published by 
a user such as photos, videos, tweets, 
retweets, shares etc. 
Artifacts from each group can independently be 
used to infer user activity and, when combined, can 
be used to corroborate other related artifacts found 
on disk. 
It is important to note that there is currently a 
knowledge gap with regard to formalizing the 
acquisition and analysis of social network artifacts. 
Some of the existing (traditional) digital forensic 
tools are not wholly designed for social networking 
investigations, and the capability for targeted 
searches or the ability of the tool to interpret and 
present the evidence in a human-readable format 
may be limited (Cusack & Son, 2012). For 
example, artifacts like Windows Registry Hives, 
Event logs, SQLite databases may need to be 
extracted and analyzed with a third-party tool. The 
objective of this paper is consequently to propose 
an approach that can be applied as a formal 
technique for social network investigations 
2.3 Extracting Features from Social Networking 
Artifacts 
Due to the proliferation of devices and the volume 
of data investigators need to process, it is often 
crucial to quickly identify the content of interest 
prior to a detailed analysis of a seized device. 
Feature extraction is an approach that enables 
investigators to process vast quantities of data in an 
efficient manner (see (Garfinkel, 2006; Garfinkel, 
2013) for more on feature extraction). 
A user’s interaction with a digital device 
(computer) is a two-way process aptly explained by 
Locard’s Exchange Principle (Chisum & Turvey, 
2000) which states that every contact leaves a trace 
(Locard 1934, pp. 7-8 as cited in (Chisum & 
Turvey, 2007) (pp. 23-24)). With regard to digital 
evidence, this principle can be adopted to explain 
the existence of artifacts created as a result of user 
activity. For example, creating a user account, 
installing an application such as a web browser, or 
visiting social networking sites, all leave traces that 
can be used to infer what a user has done. 
In the context of this paper, feature identification 
(and extraction) is described as the process of 
identifying and extracting artifacts containing key 
information about a user’s social networking 
activities. Features in this context can be extracted 
from the absolute path of a given URL or other 
related artifacts such as HTML or JSON data, using 
pattern matching methods such as Regular 
Expressions (RegEx). The reoccurrence of a given 
feature can thus be attributed to a user’s repeated 
access to a resource on a social networking site  
(Garfinkel, 2006). 
2.3.1 Identify Features in URLs 
Every website visited by a user has a URL which 
indicates where resources are located, and the 
protocol used in accessing those resources. RFC 
1738 describes URL as a compact string 
representation for a resource available via the 
Internet (Berners-Lee et al., 1994). It also describes 
the URL syntax as being made up of the following 
components: 
<scheme>:<scheme-specific-part> 
The <scheme> part defines the protocol used e.g. 
ftp, http. The <scheme-specific-part> varies and is 
dependent on the protocol used.  





An example of a HTTP URL with three parts is 
shown in Figure 2. The query or search part of a 
URL may also be complex, having several 
parameters, as seen in Figure 3.  
Some URLs may also specify subdomains or port 
numbers.
 
Two-Stage Model   JDFSL V15N2 
© 2020 JDFSL   Page 5 
 
Figure 2 An example showing the parts of a HTTP URL
 
Figure 3 Example HTTP URL with multiple query or searchpart parameters 
 
URLs can be generated in several ways, for 
example, clicking on a link in an email or a web 
page; clicking a bookmark or a shortcut; typing an 
address in the browser address bar, or using the 





Figure 4 An example of the URL autocomplete/suggestion feature
URLs can provide much information about what a 
user has been doing online – from pages accessed 
to content searched for or shared. For this research, 
considering that URL structure is not browser 
dependent, identifying features in URLs involves 
decomposing the URL and decoding everything 
after the protocol part of the URL (i.e., <scheme-
specific-part>) and in some instances, everything 
after the domain name part. This includes the path, 
parameters, and their values and fragments. 
For investigations involving social network 
activities, finding and recovering actionable 
intelligence/evidence will help narrow the scope 
and refocus an investigation, thus maximizing the 
use of the investigator’s time. Although there has 
been research in the forensic investigation of online 
activity and web browser artifacts, there is 
knowledge gap with regards to the deconstruction 
of individual URLs in relation to social networking 
activity. There is also limited research specifically 
focused on the modeling of social network forensic 
investigations processes and the extraction of 
features from deconstructed URLs. 
The research described in this paper highlights the 
need for a concise model for the investigation and 
analysis of such social media related artifacts. It 
also highlights the importance of features in 
understanding user intent and the attribution of 
actions to a user. 
3. PROPOSED MODEL 
Building on the identified need for a new approach 
to forensic analysis of social media data, there are 
two key areas to consider - understanding user 
activity and the types of artifacts that this can 
generate, as well as the links between the two. 
3.1 Defining “User Activity” 
In general, there are three basic ways a user 
interacts with a computer: 
1. Create/modify: This includes the creation 
of new files e.g., documents, modifying 
existing files, installing applications, file 
upload, or download. 
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2. Read/access: This includes accessing files 
with read, write, execute permissions. This 
type of interaction includes actions like 
launching a web browser (execute); 
generating an entry in the browser history 
(write), opening a folder or file (read). 
3. Delete/remove files: This includes 
deliberate or unintentional removal of a file 
or application, e.g., uninstall, delete. 
In the context of this paper, these activities can be 
broadly classified as: 
• Pre-browser activities: 
o i.e., power on a device (computer), 
login, launch the web browser. 
• Browser activities:  
o i.e., type in a URL in the address 
bar; click on a website shortcut; 
select autocomplete URL 
suggestion in the browser. This 
also includes accessing resources 
on a website, e.g., posts, uploads, 
downloads; such actions are 
recorded in the browser history, 
cache, etc. 
• Post-browser activities:  
o i.e., close the web browser, some 
of the contents in memory are then 
written to disk, some are not 
recorded; power off the device. 
At each point during any form of interaction with a 
device (pre-browser, browser, and post-browser), 
artifacts are created, allowing inference of what 
occurred. In any investigation where there is more 
than one user account on the device, to prove an 
action was initiated by a user, it is important to 
identify and highlight artifacts (including 
corroborating evidence) that determine whether the 
user being investigated was at the keyboard of the 
device in question within the timeframe of an 
incident. 
3.2 Artifact Types 
Artifacts found on a digital device can be broadly 
categorized into system generated and user 
generated artifacts (Mabuto & Venter, 2012): 
• System generated: these are artifacts 
created by the operating system (OS) or an 
application on the computer without direct 
user action. System generated artifacts are 
created when core OS functions are 
performed by the OS or when a user 
performs core OS tasks. These artifacts can 
also be described as context artifacts. 
Examples include Event logs (user 
login/logout events); setup or configuration 
entries (created when a user 
enables/disables a function, installs an 
application, or when device drivers are 
installed).  
• User generated: these are artifacts created 
as a result of a user’s direct interaction with 
an application. For example, installing a 
web browser, accessing a website, creating 
a local document, downloading a file, 
deleting files, or uninstalling an 
application. 
3.2.1 Sources of Determination 
There are several ways an investigator can build a 
picture or reconstruct an event and attribute actions 
to a user based on the artifacts recovered. These 
include but are not limited to using: 
• Local Files: Created, modified, accessed 
dates and times can be determined when 
files resident on the device are analyzed. 
• URLs:  By deconstructing the URL, it is 
possible to determine what sites have been 
visited and what the user had typed in the 
address bar or search box, e.g., 
search?q=statlerwaldorf&src=typd 
• System setup or configuration logs: This 
infers when an application was installed; a 
file was created, number of times run or 
accessed, last time an application was run, 
or a file was accessed. It may also contain 
the path to Event logs. 
• System Event logs: Logging is a way for 
the OS to record information about system 
activities that occur. This includes date and 
time of the event; hostname/computer 
name of device involved; username of who 
was logged in to the machine when the 
event occurred; the program that triggered 
the event etc. In Windows, an identification 
number is assigned to each event type 
(Ultimate IT Security, 2014). 
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Attribution in the context of this paper requires an 
approach that links a user (or user account) to the 
web activity being investigated. The two-stage 
model proposed in this paper can be used to 
achieve this. This model is intended to produce 
case-specific and general artifacts in a social 
networking investigation: 
i. Case-specific artifacts: these can be 
described as artifacts that are indicative of 
an action/activity of interest. For example, 
this feature “A” from the URL “Y” infers 
that the user clicked on the “X” tab on 
Twitter.  
ii. General artifacts: these can be described as 
artifacts that provide an explanation of how 
an action occurred. These may also include 
artifacts expected to occur as a result of a 
user’s activity on a social networking site. 
For example, clicking on a tab or link on a 
web page generates a new URL; however, 
HTTP headers or the JSON artifacts for the 
browser will indicate if a link was clicked 
as well as if there is a referrer URL. This is 
discussed further in Section 5.1.2. 
3.3 Two-Stage Model 








Figure 5 A schematic illustration of the proposed two-stage model for the investigations of social network activity 
 
Stage 1: URL feature extraction 
The first stage of this model involves the 
identification and recovery of URLs from the disk 
and the extraction of features from the URLs. The 
URL, in this instance, is the main/core source of 
features for online activity. For example, the social 
network site visited or the actions performed by the 
user (search, follow). It is important to note that 
URLs are not platform dependent, so this approach 
can be applied to any platform (i.e., OS or 
browser). 
Features are extracted using a combination of 
RegEx and the sqlite3 module in Python. Artifacts 
recovered are stored in CSV files containing the 
dates and times of activity, the full URL, and 
extracted feature(s), which can be used to infer user 
activity or allude to the user’s intent. 
Stage 2: Corroborating evidence 
Corroborating artifacts validate each piece of 
evidence found during an investigation. In the 
context of this paper, corroborating artifacts 
provide both confirmation and supplementary 
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information about the artifacts recovered during the 
URL feature extraction stage. 
This stage of the model involves the identification 
and recovery of artifacts that validate what a URL 
feature indicates. These types of artifacts provide 
context to the features extracted from a URL. For 
example, the HTTP header information in the cache 
may show a URL that contains “/settings/account” 
was created as a result of clicking on the “account” 
link in the page “settings” causing the browser to 
respond by updating the URL and rendering the 
requested content. In addition to information 
derived from HTTP headers found in the browser 
cache (or unallocated space), metadata from the 
web page HTML could be useful in understanding 
the user’s interaction with the social networking 
site. 
This stage also involves the recovery of core OS 
artifacts that back up what has been inferred of the 
user’s activity. For example, downloaded files 
associated with the recovered URLs; a local copy 
of uploaded data (associated with a 
“www.domain_name/upload” URL); artifacts 
indicating that a downloaded application was 
installed and run “X” number of times including the 
physical path of the application; artifacts verifying 
application paths. 
The proposed model is useful for both the recovery 
of actionable intelligence and for focusing and 
ensuring a structured investigation. Having a “URL 
feature extraction” stage takes the bulk of URL 
artifacts and extracts meaningful information from 
them. This is useful because the digital forensic 
investigator needs a clear understanding of the 
URL structure in order to extract useable 
information from it. 
When artifacts from the “URL” stage have been 
extracted, corroborating (supplementary) artifacts 
are used to contextualize events and help digital 
evidence meet the requirement to be beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
This paper presents work that improves on existing 
research on the forensic investigation of social 
network activities. It provides context by 
identifying and highlighting the importance of 
artifacts that corroborate or supplement the 
extracted feature(s). This includes data in URLs 
that ordinarily may be missed due to the volume of 
information returned by conventional digital 
forensics tools, data from HTTP headers, and 
general browser artifacts. 
 
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This section presents the data generation and 
analysis methodology for this paper. 
 
 
4.1 Data Generation 
The experiments for this paper were conducted in 
virtual environments running Windows 7 and 
Windows 10, respectively, with the Firefox browser 
installed via an executable in a network shared 
folder. Firefox version 61 was installed with rolling 
updates up to version 69. 
The purpose of these experiments was to simulate 
real-life activity on a social networking site and to 
create a feasible model for investigating such 
activities. The need to ensure the repeatability of 
the experiments made it necessary to use a virtual 
environment. 
During the experimental phase, Fiddler (Telerik, 
2018) was used to capture HTTP requests in order 
to understand how individual parts of a URL can be 
deconstructed; what was sent to the webserver and 
the response returned to the client (web browser); 
what was cached eventually irrespective of “no-
cache” options in the header etc. 
Data generation for this paper involved creating a 
local user account in the Windows virtual machine 
(VM) and creating a user account on Twitter using 
Firefox. Normal user activity was simulated by 
conducting a variety of the activities listed below 
over the course of the experiment: 
• Powering on the VM and log in 
• Launch the web browser 
• Login to the test user account on Twitter 
• Searching for users to follow 
• Sending tweets 
• Reply and retweet 
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• Viewing and sending Direct Messages 
(DMs) 
• Send follow requests to other test user 
accounts 
• Viewing and accepting follow requests  
• Updating the test user account privacy 
settings 
• Continuous scrolling and viewing the test 
user account timeline 
During the experiments, all activity was logged in a 
contemporaneous note as a means of verifying the 
user activity against the results found during the 
analysis. 
4.2 Data Analysis 
The analysis was conducted in a Windows 10 
desktop environment using existing digital 
forensics tools. This was done to identify and 
understand artifacts of interest in a social 
networking investigation and to help with the 
implementation of the proposed model. The data 
analysis covered core OS artifacts and user 
generated artifacts, and a multi-tool analysis 
technique was employed. The following tools were 
used: 
• General examination tool:  
o WinHex (X-Ways Software 
Technology AG, 2018): this was used 
to view the virtual disk contents and for 
the extraction of artifacts to be 
analyzed with third-party tools (listed 
below). It was also used for 
simultaneous keyword search. WinHex 
simultaneous search function allows a 
list of search terms (one per line) to be 
searched at once. 
 
• Tools used for individual artifact analysis: 
o Registry Decoder (Case & Marziale): 
this was used to analyze the registry 
hives. 
o RegRipper (Carvey, 2018): this was 
used to validate the results from 
Registry Decoder. 
o DB Browser for SQLite (DB4S 
Project, n.d.): used for the analysis of 
user browser SQLite databases in the 
user’s Firefox profile. 
o MZCacheView (NirSoft, 2018): used 
for the analysis of the Firefox cache 
artifacts. 
o FullEventLogView (NirSoft, 
FullEventLogView, 2018): used for the 
analysis of Windows event logs. 
o Prefetch Forensics (Woan, 2013): used 
for the analysis of prefetch artifacts. 
o Python 3 (Python.org, 2019): python 
scripts were used to convert the 
sessionstore files to JSON format and 
to extract features from extracted 
URLs. 
 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This section discusses the experimental results, 
following the proposed two-stage model approach. 
These are categorized into URL feature artifacts 
and corroborating artifacts. 
 
5.1 Implementation 
Artifacts of interest in this research include user 
and system generated artifacts related to user 
activity on Twitter. This includes URLs generated 
as a result of Twitter activity (login, searching for 
followers, viewing followers, tweeting etc.) and 
system generated artifacts that give context to a 
user’s activity. 
5.1.1 URL Feature Artifacts 
As discussed in previous sections, features from 
URLs can be used to give context to or infer user 
action. URL artifacts were recovered from the 
user’s Firefox Profile using DB Browser for 
SQLite. It is important to differentiate between the 
History location and the Cache location as both 
folders share the same name. In this section, when 
the Firefox Profile folder is mentioned, it refers to 
the folder containing the browser history. The 
Cache is discussed in Section 5.1.2.3. 




Roaming. The profile folder contains a subdirectory 
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with a .default extension e.g., oeds8ys7.default, 
which contains the SQLite database files (as shown 
in Figure 6), session information files, and other 
files and directories used by Firefox. 
 
Figure 6 SQLite database files in the Firefox Profile folder 
 
5.1.1.1 History 
The browser history is written to places.sqlite and 
was analyzed using DB Browser for SQLite. The 
query was focused on URLs indicative of accessing 
Twitter. The returned URLs include login, timeline, 
search, profile views, and follow/follower 
activities. Extracts of the results are shown in 
Figure 7 (although the experimental user is 
fictitious, certain parts of the URL have been 
modified to remove identifying information).  
The extracts show standard Twitter activity URLs 






Figure 7 URLs showing user activity (recovered from places.sqlite) 
 
The results from DB Browser for SQLite were 
exported and saved in .csv format ready for URL 
deconstruction. 
Using the contemporaneous notes, URLs were 
grouped based on user activity. Tables 1 - 3 show a 
profile/timeline view, clicking the followers link on 
the user’s timeline and viewing follower requests, 
respectively. 
 
Table 1 Timeline URL and tab title 
URL Tab title 
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https://twitter.com/NxxxxxxxOxxx 
(User’s home/timeline) 
Oxxx Nxxxxxxx (@Nxxxxxxxxxxd) | Twitter 
(Tab title contains user’s full name and 
(@user’s handle)) 
Table 2 URL generated when the “followers” link is clicked 
URL Tab title 
https://twitter.com/NxxxxxxxOxxx/followers 
 (Created when “followers” is clicked) 




Table 3 URL generated when the “followers” link is clicked to view follow requests 
URL Tab title 
https://twitter.com/NxxxxxxxOxxx/follower_requests 
(“pending follower requests” is clicked.) 
Oxxx Nxxxxxxx (@Nxxxxxxxxxxd) | Twitter 
(Tab title) 
 
During the experiments, the account security and 
privacy settings were updated. This includes 
making the account private etc. The user clicked on 
settings and was directed to the account page from 
where security and privacy settings can be 




Table 4 URL indicative of account settings modification 
URL 
https://twitter.com/settings/account 
(This URL takes the user to the ‘Account page’ from where the user account settings can be modified.) 
 
Table 5 URLs indicative of privacy settings modification 
URL 
https://twitter.com/settings/safety 
(When the user clicks on ‘Privacy and safety’ within settings, this URL is created. This page allows the 
user to set tweets as private, disable location tagging etc.) 
 
To break down the URLs into manageable 
components, the CSV and re modules in Python 3 
were used, as seen in the example code extract 
below. The features including the date and time of 
access were written to a CSV file using a version of 
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The examples below are some of the saved feature 
matches; they are intended to help an analyst make 
sense of how an event happened. For example, the 
user accessed Twitter on date and time; then, the 
user navigated to this part of the page; the user 
searched for this other user etc.  
When sorted by the date and time of activity, it can 













# open the csv file 
with open("history.csv") as hist: 
    # read the csv file 
    readCSV = csv.reader(hist, delimiter=',') 
   for row in  csv file 
       for item in  row 
           if ‘twitter’ in item 
              pattern = your_regex_pattern 
             regex_search = re.compile(pattern, re.IGNORECASE) 
            matches = regexp.findall(item) 
 
           # write regex match to a csv file 
          with open("matched_patterns.csv", 'a') as mp: 
         mp.write("{0}, {1}".format(row[0], ','.join(matches)) + '\n') 
2016-01-17 21H:09M:49S, twitter.com, MissPiggy?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle 
2018-12-01 18H:18M:12S, twitter.com, login 
2018-12-01 18H:18M:13S, twitter.com, i, notifications 
2018-12-01 18H:21M:14S, twitter.com, settings, account 
2018-12-01 18H:21M:14S, twitter.com, settings, safety 
2018-12-01 18H:21M:52S, twitter.com, Nxxxxxxxxxxd, followers 
2018-12-01 18H:21M:52S, twitter.com, follower_requests 
2018-12-01 18H:21M:52S, twitter.com, Sxxxxxxxh3 
2018-12-01 18H:21M:52S, twitter.com, Nxxxxxxxxxxd 
2019-11-08 11H:46M:15S, twitter.com, Pxxxxxxxxxd 
2019-11-11 15H:14M:45S, twitter.com, DxxxxxKxxxx, with_replies 
2019-12-24 11H:53M:39S, twitter.com, jxxxxhxxxxx, status, 544385844081987584  
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5.1.2 Corroborating Artifacts 
Corroborating artifacts, as discussed in Section 3.3 
are artifacts that provide context to the URL 
artifacts recovered using the two-stage model 
proposed in this paper. This section discusses 
corroborating artifacts as they relate to the URL 
artifacts discussed in the preceding section. 
5.1.2.1 Other SQLite Database Files 
Cookies.sqlite records cookies set during a 
browsing session. It provided corroborating 
information for the features that were recovered 
from URLs in Section 5.1.1.1. Figure 8 shows a 




Figure 8 Cookies set in cookies.sqlite indicates the setting/safety page was accessed on twitter.com 
 
The cookie information can be used in conjunction 
with other artifacts to determine and link the 
browsing session where the activity of interest 
occurred, as shown in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9 Login credentials from formhistory.sqlite shows the last time the recorded email address was used 
 
Formhistory.sqlite records entries made in form 
fields in Firefox. These are stored in key:value pairs 
where the fieldname is the key and the entry typed 
into a text field is the value. Information recovered 
shows the login username for the user’s Twitter 
account and the last time the username was used. 
Webappsstore.sqlite stores data for websites in 
key:value pairs. In this instance, the value of the 
__typeahead__:userHash key contained 
information on the user’s Twitter account including 
that of over 500 other Twitter users. This amount of 
information can be overwhelming; however, using 
features such as @user_handle, user_id, profile_id, 
extracted from the URLs, it can be filtered down to 
a manageable size.  
Artifacts from webappsstore such as the values of 
“followed_by” and “following” within 
“social_context” as seen in Figure 10, can be used 
to infer a user’s social connection (relationship) to 
other users.  
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Figure 10 Extracts from webappsstore.sqlite contain JSON data that can be used to determine a user’s 
follow/following status on Twitter 
 
5.1.2.2 Session Information 
Artifacts supporting follow activity identified 
during the URL extraction stage were recovered 
from Firefox sessionstore. Sessionstore (as at the 
time of writing) is stored in a compressed file 
format (MOZLZ4/JSONLZ4) in the browser profile 
folder and is used by Firefox to manage the ability 
to restore currently open windows and tabs in the 
event of a crash or forced restart. It can also be used 
to open previous tabs on startup following a clean 
exit.  






• upgrade.jsonlz4-[datetimestamp] (session 
state before a browser version upgrade) 
The information of interest in sessionstore includes 
URL, page title, referrer URL; time a tab was last 
accessed or closed; the time a window was last 
accessed or closed; session start/last updated time; 
cookies associated with the session. 
The sessionstore file was decompressed from LZ4 
to JSON format, using the lz4 module in Python 3. 
When analyzed, it provided information on the user 
session and corroborated the activities inferred by 
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Figure 11 JSON (sessionstore) artifacts showing session where user account settings were accessed 
 
JSON artifacts, such as the extracts shown in 
Figure 12, are useful in identifying the session a 




Figure 12 JSON (sessionstore) artifacts showing referrer URL through which the user reached “followers” 
 
When the URL contains a username other than the 
logged in user, it indicates a visit to the other user’s 
timeline/profile.  
 
Figure 13 shows a visit to the profile (URL) and the 




Figure 13 JSON (sessionstore) artifacts indicate the user visited another user’s profile and sent a tweet 
In order to establish timelines, it is important to 
view the session within which the activity of 
interest occurred as shown in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14 JSON (sessionstore) artifacts showing the last accessed date and time for the session 
 
5.1.2.3 Cache 
The Firefox cache can be found in: 
%SYSTEMROOT%\Users\<username>\AppData\
Local\Mozilla\Firefox\Profile. The profile directory 
contains a subdirectory with a .default extension 
and an identical name to that of the history profile 
folder (see Section 5.1.1).  
During the analysis of the cache, artifacts recovered 
were indicative of a user’s direct interaction with 
other users, for example, profile banners and profile 
photo URLs and images. These URLs validated the 
contents of webappsstore.sqlite and sessionstore 
and are shown below in Figures 15 and 16: 
 
 
Figure 15 Extract of user profile data from webappsstore.sqlite 
 
 
Figure 16 Extract of user profile image from the cache 
 
Some of the http://pbs.twimg.com URLs were for 
profiles the user did not interact with. Just as with 
the webappsstore artifacts, the URLs can be 
grouped into a separate category after the features 
extracted in Section 5.1.1.1 have been used to filter 
out the URLs of interest, indicating social 
networking activity. 
It is important to know that some of the URLs 
recovered from the cache were as a result of 
background processes on Twitter. For example, 
hashflags and hashtags. Hashflags can be described 
as custom emojis that accompany a hashtag (e.g., 
#StarWars ) and are used by Twitter to promote 
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Hashflag URLs may be cached even though they 
have not been viewed or used by the user. An 









Hashtag URLs from the “Trends for you” frame on 
the user’s Twitter homepage were also recovered. 
The user also did not interact with this part of 
Twitter or use hashtags during the experiment. 














Some of the recovered URLs were from 
suggested/promoted tweets advertised on the user’s 
timeline. It is important to note that these 
ads/sponsored content can be found on disk even 
when a user hasn’t clicked on them. In the context 
of this paper, they were a result of continuous 
scrolling on the user timeline. These tweets can be 








xdm is cross-domain messaging, and the expected 
value for xdm_e is the base URL of the host. As 
shown in the Google Analytics URL above, the 
base URL is https:twitter.com. To determine 
whether a user is following an advertiser, the value 
for “is_following_advertiser” would be “true”. 
Figure 17 shows an extract of HTTP Request and 
Response headers captured through Fiddler, which 
7109699712   68 74 74 70 73 3A 2F 2F  61 62 73 2E 74 77 69 6D   https://abs.twim 
7109699728   67 2E 63 6F 6D 2F 68 61  73 68 66 6C 61 67 73 2F   g.com/hashflags/ 
7109699744   57 42 5F 4C 65 67 6F 4D  6F 76 69 65 5F 45 6D 6D   WB_LegoMovie_Emm 
7109699760   65 74 2F 57 42 5F 4C 65  67 6F 4D 6F 76 69 65 5F   et/WB_LegoMovie_ 







7096393600                            68 74 74 70 73 3A 2F 2F           https:// 
7096393616   74 77 69 74 74 65 72 2E  63 6F 6D 2F 68 61 73 68   twitter.com/hash 
7096393632   74 61 67 2F 57 72 61 74  68 4F 66 4B 68 61 6E 3F   tag/WrathOfKhan? 
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was used to monitor Twitter traffic during the 
experiment. Fiddler was used to determine what 
was expected to be written to disk, what eventually 
was written to disk and what was not written to 
disk. The ad URLs captured by Fiddler corroborate 
the Twitter advertising URL recovered from the 
user's Firefox cache. They show that the 




Figure 17 Extracts from Fiddler showing the HTTP Request and Response for the cached sponsored content 
 
Due to the volume of cached data, and although 
they may not be used for user relationship 
attribution, it is important to identify and highlight 
social networking artifacts that are unrelated to 
direct user interaction. This would help an 
investigator/analyst focus on artifacts of immediate 
interest. For example, grouping sponsored content 
into different categories, separating them from 
normal user accounts. 
5.1.2.4 Registry and Event Logs 
The artifacts presented in this section come from a 
range of sources (OS and user generated). They aim 
to answer questions such as the number of user 
accounts on the system, the logged in user; dates 
and times of activity; applications installed or 
accessed; paths to files and applications etc. 
Where there are multiple user accounts on a device, 
it is important to identify registered accounts of 
interest, credentials, permissions, and dates and 
times of access. These can be identified and 
recovered by analyzing the SAM registry hive and 
reviewing Windows Event logs. The hives (Table 
6) were extracted using WinHex and information 
about the user account, such as when the account 
was created, the username, the account type, 
application (browser) installation, and access were 
recovered. 
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The SAM hive provided information on the user 
accounts, date and time created and last login time.  
 
The last login date and time can be used to 











Extracts from the SYSTEM hive indicate the path 
of the Firefox installer in the network shared 







This type of information recovered from the 
Registry when cross referenced with Event logs 
(Figure 19) verifies user account information and 
may be used to link identities matching the 
username, e.g., registered social network 
credentials. It can also be used to attribute specific 
browser (social network activity) sessions to a user 
based on login/logoff times correlated using the 
“LogonId” as seen in Figures 18 and 19. 
 
 
Other artifacts of interest were recovered from 
NTUSER.DAT, indicating when the browser 
(Firefox) was installed, the set default browser as 
shown in Table 7, where it was launched from and 
the number of times the browser was launched as 
shown in Table 8—for example, starting Firefox 
from the desktop or taskbar shortcut. This could 
help corroborate sessions and social network 
activity. 
 
Table 2 Default browser setting from the Registry 
Firefox is set as the default browser 
StartMenuInternet [Sat Aug 18 18:11:33 2018 (UTC)] 
NOTE: default Internet Browser client key 





Username        : Oxxx Nxxxxxxx [1000] 
Full Name       :  
User Comment    :  
Account Type    : Default Admin User 
Account Created : Sun Sep 25 14:44:15 2016 Z 
Name            :   
Last Login Date : Sat Dec  1 18:12:26 2018 Z 
Pwd Reset Date  : Sun Sep 25 14:44:15 2016 Z 
Pwd Fail Date   : Never 
Login Count     : 8 
 
1533971040|REG|||M... AppCompatCache - 
Z:\shared_installer_files\Firefox Setup 61.0.2.exe 
 
1533670994|REG|||M... [Program Execution] AppCompatCache - 
C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe [Executed] 
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Table 3 Firefox executed once from Taskbar shortcut 
Browser execution and Run count 
Datetime stamp Path Run count 




Event IDs 4720, 4624, and 4647 mean 'A user 
account was created', 'An account was successfully 
logged on' and 'User initiated logoff' respectively 
[40]. There are other description fields in the 
Windows event logs that can provide additional 
information (e.g., Account Security ID, Domain 
etc.), but they are out of scope for this paper. 




Figure 18 Account creation dates, time, username (extract from Security Event log) 
 
 
Figure 19 Login date, time, type and username (extract from Security Event log) 
 
 
Figure 20 Logoff date, time, and username (extract from Security Event log) 
 
The artifacts presented in this section provide 
additional means of contextualizing the URL 
artifacts discussed in Section 5.1.1. This 
information shows that the browser session activity, 
as discussed in Section 5.1.2.2 is within the time 
frame of the user’s last logon and logoff on the 
system. 
5.1.2.5 Prefetch 
Prefetch is used by Windows for memory 
management, speeding up the boot process and 
application startup process. Prefetch files can be 
found in %SYSTEMROOT%\Prefetch and have a 
.pf extension. 
Prefetch helps an investigator determine when an 
application was installed when it was last run, and 
the number of times the application was run. In the 
context of this research, Prefetch provides 
information related to Firefox; thus, corroborating 
other artifacts recovered previously. Figure 21 
shows the prefetch files for when Firefox was 
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installed, the last time it was launched and the 




Figure 21 Firefox last run date and run count 
 
5.1.2.6 Keyword Search 
As the last task of the second stage of the model, a 
keyword search was used to recover artifacts 
resident in other parts of the disk such as 
unallocated space, slack space, and pagefile. The 
simultaneous search feature in WinHex was used to 
search across a variety of character encodings. A 
keyword search is useful in the identification and 
recovery of outlier artifacts that may be resident in 
the unstructured part of a disk where they are not 
readily visible or accessible when viewed in a 
digital forensics tool. 
It is important to use search terms or strings that 
would reduce the number of false positives 
returned. This may involve using some of the 
features extracted from the URLs or keys from 
JSON data discussed in Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2.2. 
Examples of the search terms used include but is 





Figure 22 shows an example of the results returned 




Figure 22 Tweet Fragment from unallocated space
Keyword searches also highlight artifacts that may 
be of interest. For instance, Figure 23 shows an 
example of a Google Analytics (GA) URL 









Table 9 breaks down the login URL. Additional 
parameters from the GA URL also allude to 
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Figure 23 Twitter login activity captured in google analytics URL 
 
Other GA URLs returned from the keyword search 
indicates user access to “settings/account”, 
“settings/safety”, “safety/security” etc. on Twitter. 
When investigating social network activity, GA 









6934584320               68 74 74 70  73 3A 2F 2F 77 77 77 2E       https://www. 
6934584336   67 6F 6F 67 6C 65 2D 61  6E 61 6C 79 74 69 63 73   google-analytics 
6934584352   2E 63 6F 6D 2F 63 6F 6C  6C 65 63 74 3F 76 3D 31   .com/collect?v=1 
6934584368   26 5F 76 3D 6A 37 32 26  61 69 70 3D 31 26 61 3D   &_v=j72&aip=1&a= 
6934584384   32 39 34 37 38 31 38 35  33 26 74 3D 70 61 67 65   294781853&t=page 
6934584400   76 69 65 77 26 5F 73 3D  32 26 64 6C 3D 68 74 74   view&_s=2&dl=htt 
6934584416   70 73 25 33 41 25 32 46  25 32 46 74 77 69 74 74   ps%3A%2F%2Ftwitt 
6934584432   65 72 2E 63 6F 6D 25 32  46 73 65 74 74 69 6E 67   er.com%2Fsetting 
6934584448   73 25 32 46 73 61 66 65  74 79 26 64 72 3D 68 74   s%2Fsafety&dr=ht 
6934584464   74 70 73 25 33 41 25 32  46 25 32 46 74 77 69 74   tps%3A%2F%2Ftwit 
6934584480   74 65 72 2E 63 6F 6D 25  32 46 73 65 74 74 69 6E   ter.com%2Fsettin 
6934584496   67 73 25 32 46 73 61 66  65 74 79 26 64 70 3D 25   gs%2Fsafety&dp=% 
6934584512   32 46 75 73 65 72 25 32  46 68 6F 6D 65 25 32 46   2Fuser%2Fhome%2F 
6934584528   68 6F 6D 65 26 75 6C 3D  65 6E 2D 67 62 26 64 65   home&ul=en-gb&de 
6934584544   3D 55 54 46 2D 38 26 64  74 3D 54 77 69 74 74 65   =UTF-8&dt=Twitte 
6934584560   72 26 73 64 3D 32 34 2D  62 69 74 26 73 72 3D 31   r&sd=24-bit&sr=1 
6934584576   30 32 34 78 37 36 38 26  76 70 3D 31 30 30 37 78   024x768&vp=1007x 
6934584592   36 35 34 26 6A 65 3D 30  26 5F 75 3D 53 41 43 41   654&je=0&_u=SACA 
6934584608   41 51 41 42 7E 26 6A 69  64 3D 26 67 6A 69 64 3D   AQAB~&jid=&gjid= 
6934584624   26 63 69 64 3D 38 33 37  39 39 38 39 36 35 2E 31   &cid=837998965.1 
6934584640   35 34 33 36 38 38 35 31  35 26 74 69 64 3D 55 41   543688515&tid=UA 
6934584656   2D 33 30 37 37 35 2D 36  26 5F 67 69 64 3D 31 33   -30775-6&_gid=13 
6934584672   37 32 33 37 30 37 31 36  2E 31 35 34 33 36 38 38   72370716.1543688 
6934584688   35 31 35 26 7A 3D 34 37  33 37 33 33 30 30 35 00   515&z=473733005 
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Table 9 Google analytics URL parameter breakdown (Google Developers, 2018) 
Parameter Value Description 
t pageview This is the ‘Hit’ type. Permitted values for this parameter are 
'pageview', 'screenview', 'event', 'transaction', 'item', 'social', 
'exception', 'timing'. 
_s 1 Hit sequence. The value increments by 1 with each pageview 
hit. 
dl https://twitter.com/ Document location URL: This parameter sends a resource (or 
document) location. 
dr https://twitter.com/login Document referrer: the format for the value for this parameter is 
a URL (and specifies the referral source of traffic). 
dp /user/home/home Document path (i.e. resource path) specifies the ‘path’ portion 
of the URL. 
ul en-gb User language 
de UTF-8 This specifies the character set used in encoding the page / 
resource (twitter). 
dt Twitter Document title. In this instance, “Twitter” is the page title. 
 
 
Figure 24 Cookies.sqlite shows cookie info found in google analytics URL 
 
Recovering and correctly interpreting artifacts such 
as the ones discussed in this section will enable the 
investigator/analyst to explain the important aspects 
of the recovered URL features in the context of a 
user’s social relationships and activity. For 
example, explaining: 
i. a user’s connection to a social networking 
site e.g., account set up and credentials 
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ii. a user’s social relationships, e.g., if the user 
is following or being followed by another 
user 
iii. whether Twitter IDs found are as a result of 
direct contact, sponsored content or 
background processes 
 
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper has proposed a two-stage model for 
investigating social network activity. It has shown 
that a user’s social networking activity can be 
inferred based on a range of artifacts, and it is 
possible based on these artifacts recovered, to 
identify and prioritize evidence that is pertinent to a 
case.  
Although the syntax (protocol://hostname/path) is 
constant, some parts of URLs may be subject to 
change in structure due to improvements/changes 
implemented by the service provider. Such changes 
may include the implementation of shortened URLs 
or changing the location of resources on the 
website, e.g., moving user photos from /home to 
/home/profile. 
This model is currently focused on manual analysis 
with the help of digital forensics tools. Further 
work is required to improve this model by 
automating each stage of the evidence recovery 
process and testing its generalizability and 
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